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Pluralism in America
Cook lectures explore the changing nature of religion
and morality
It was to questions of secularization, the responses its evokes
from organized religion, and the
challenges it poses for a pluralistic
society founded on a religiously
tinged civil creed that this year's
William W. Cook Lectures on
American Institutions were
devoted. They were delivered by
Peter Berger, the distinguished
sociologist and author whose
books include The Heretical Imperative, The Sacred Canopy, and
Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change. Currently
University Professor at Boston
University, Berger has been
hailed as a highly original thinker
who has had a major impact on
the social sciences, most notably
in the areas of the sociology of
knowledge, modernization theory, the politics of development,
ethics, and religion.
To the examination of "Dimensions of Pluralism: Religion and
Morality in America," Berger
brought erudition, organization,
and a sense of commitment leavened by dry wit.
In his first lecture, "Secularization and Counter-Secularization,"
Berger identified secularization
as a dialectical process that
increases with modernization and
results in a transfer of power from
the religious to the lay.
Today's America, Berger said, is
far more secular than it was 25
years ago. As signs of the change,
he cited the shocks to the national
creed of the last two decades, the
increasingly sharp line the courts
have drawn between church and
state, and increasing secularization within the church itself.
From increasing secularization
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have come the seeds of the neotraditionalist, evangelistic
religious movements whose goal
it is to return the country to perceived nineteenth-century values.
A search for the mechanism
underlying the secularizationcounter-secularization dialogue
leads to America's commitment to
pluralism, Berger said. In a society characterized by both
pluralism and secularization, pluralism's fluidity and tentativeness
infuse the religious domain; religious certitude becomes a rare
commodity, and a religious marketplace develops-witness the
consumer-oriented phrase "religious preference"-in which
there is ample room, indeed
demand, for those who purport to
purvey certitude.
The protagonists in the secularization-counter-secularization
dialogue are as different from one
another as an "enrage undertaker
from Indianapolis" and a "public
interest lawyer from Cambridge,
Massachusetts," Berger said.
Exemplars, respectively, of the
counter-secularization and secularization forces, Berger's "enrage
undertaker" and "public interest
lawyer" also represent today's
two middle classes, the business
class and the smaller, but more
influential, knowledge class,
which split the old middle class
vertically between them. The
causes that have become symbols
of the knowledge class- abortion
and school prayer, for exampleare also the rallying points for
those who resent this class and its
thrust for power.
In his second lecture, "From
Religious to Moral Pluralism,"

Berger brought erudition as well as a
sense of commitment and wit to his
lectures.

Berger focused on the consequences of what he calls "the
heretical imperative" -modem
man's "condemnation" to freedom of choice, in Sartrian terms.
In the religious sphere, dispassionate turns of phrase such as
"religious preference," or the
declaration that one is "into"
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Buddhism (or Judaism, or bomagain Protestantism) imply a voluntary commitment that goes
beyond the Constitution's legal
institutionalization of tolerance.
When a society is secularized,
Berger noted, the Ten Commandments lose their "divine clout"
and are subject, as is religion
itself, to preferential options. We
chose among the Commandments
as among other beliefs: adultery,
yes; killing, no. Religious pluralism and tolerance for others'
beliefs, however, demand a firm
underpinning of moral consensus
on basic, central issues. "A functioning society," he stated, "must
have consensus on moral issues
or it will cease functioning."
Therein lies the rub.
The country's division on abortion, the challenges to the
Protestant ethic (and hence, to
capitalism), the surprising diffusion of pacifist attitudes, the
widespread delegitimation of
patriotism and the "American
creed" are some of the many
signs, Berger said, of moral fissure in today' s America. The
"faults" frequently run along class
lines, coincide with class interests, and acquire denominational
characteristics as the opposing
camps and their churches employ
religious legitimations for their
positions.
Advancing the idea that the
central rituals and the legitimating underpinnings of American
society have been religious in
character, Berger explored the
consequences of America's religious and moral pluralism in his
third lecture, "Churches as
Mediating Structures." How can a
society hold together, he asked,
when there is no "sacred canopy"
that all of its members acknowledge in common?
One could argue, he said, that
modem society does not need a
"sacred canopy," that there is no
longer a need for religion as a
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Before his lecture, Berger (left) engaged in discussion with the noted theologian Hans
Kung, a visiting professor at the University during the fall semester.

force for symbolic integration,
that society can function like a
traffic system or any contractually
based association held together
by mutual interest and rational
agreement. Yet such solutions
are at best short term, Berger
insisted, viable only in a society
untroubled by inter-group conflict, economic recession, international crisis, or war.
Indeed, their viability may be
even more limited, for as the German proverb has it, "the devil
always dwells in the particular."
What keeps a rushed driver from
knocking down a little old lady
now and then? Individuals must
have reasons to refrain from surmounting personal difficulties
in a manner injurious to social
order. "There are sound reasons
for wondering how society can be
h eld together," Berger said, "if it
no longer has an overarching
canopy of meanings and norms."
While agreeing that secular
meaning systems do existdemocracy, socialism, and nation-

alism were three he namedBerger argued that they hold societies together only if major crises
occur. Religion, on the other
hand, inspires and motivates in
all seasons, he said.
Historically, American political
ideology combined the ideals of
democracy and nationalism with
a pervasive religiosity; despite the
Enlightenment rhetoric, Berger
noted, God was never very far
away. It was His proximity that
gave the American civil religion
subjective plausibility for most
Americans; ideology, for most
people, had to be mediated by
the religion of the churches.
For this reason, Berger said,
the Supreme Court decision
on prayer in the schools was
"an act of folly, an instance of
the legal mind going berserk in a
sociological vacuum. Predictably, the consequences have
been far reaching, as large
numbers of people have come
to feel that the state, thus
deprived of all religious symboli-
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zation, lacks true legitimacy."
Churches, however, still act as
mediating structures in our secular, pluralistic society. They
function in either interventionist
or non-interventionist modes,
with the former predominating.
Berger does not share the prointerventionist bias he says marks
discussions of religion's proper
place in American society. There
is reason to be skeptical of social
action by churches, he said, particularly when that action turns
out to be in the service of one of
the two competing elites. In addition, he finds the flexibility of
religious symbols troubling. "As
the two middle classes of Western
society assemble for battle," he
said, "members of the clergy
appear more and more as chaplains for the respective class
armies, invoking God's blessing
on their particular cause."
If churches take an interventionist stance, Berger believes
they should choose the "dialogic"
option, in which the church is
not a staging area but a politically neutral place for discussion
and reflection about current social
issues. To Berger, this is the more
promising approach in a pluralistic situation, "where it is not easy
to locate absolute justice at any
point of the societal map."
Removing the sociologist's
mask, Berger concluded his lectures with remarks made as "a
morally concerned Christian,"
remarks very much in harmony
with his subject.
"I believe in pluralism and that
it is a challenge and not a threat
to Christian faith," he said.
"What I've tried to do is to give a
picture of the enormously complex phenomenon we know as
moral pluralism, especially from
the sociological perspective. If
you find this picture plausible, I
must leave it up to you to figure
out the implications in terms of
your own values and beliefs."
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Hogan's hero
Wilbur Colom, civil rights lawyer, zs DeRoy Fellow
Wilbur Colom practices law
with his wife and three others in
Columbus, Mississippi, a town of
35,000 where lawyers, by unwritten convention, refrain from
attacks on each other and on local
institutions.
Four years ago, when he was
still fresh enough out of Antioch
Law School to have barely gained
eligibility to argue before the
Supreme Court, he took on a case
that pitted him against the town's
university, Mississippi University
for Women, and placed him front
and center before the Court,
where he had been an intern in
the Office of the Administrative
Assistant to the Chief Justice
while in law school.
The case earned Joe Hogan, a
male nurse, the right to enroll at
MUW, a school that had previously admitted only women. It
also brought national recognition
to the young black attorney and
civil rights activist who fought
the case all the way from the local
federal court to the Supreme
Court. Recently, Colom chronicled the ethical and professional
complexities of his civil rights
practice in a New York Times Magazine article, "Trials of a
Mississippi Lawyer."
Thanks to the generosity of
Helen L. DeRoy, University of
Michigan Law students got a
chance to meet Colom this October, when he spent four days at
the Law School as a DeRoy Fellow. During his stay he met
informally with students and faculty and addressed classes in
criminal law, civil procedure, evidence, trial practice, and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The DeRoy fellowships,
endowed by DeRoy in her will,

were initiated in 1980 to bring
leading lawyers and national figures to campus for sufficient
periods to attend classes, meet
with students, and offer their
insight and expertise in a variety
of informal settings.
Eminently approachable and, at
33, many law students' contemporary, Colom was actively sought
out by his intended audience.
If his down-home style surprised
students who expected more
pomp and circumstance from one
who had argued before the
Supreme Court, it also pleased
them. A superb storyteller, Colom
held classes in the palm of his
hand with tips on litigation and
nuggets about Supreme Court
personnel and procedures.
"It was refreshing to have him
here and to have him stress the
practical side of the law," said
Robert Jonker, a second-year student. "It was a different
perspective. He wants to tell you
what it's like to be a lawyer in his
kind of practice."
To point out the possibility of
"setting up an extremely interesting practice in a small town" was
precisely what Dean Terrance
Sandalow had hoped Colom
would do. "These practices," Sandalow said, "often have more
human contact than large-firm
practices and may offer the same
opportunity for intellectual challenge and for work on important
issues."
Surprised by the students'
overwhelming bias toward corporate practice, Colom stressed "that
there are other alternatives. It's
good for a law school to have
people successful in different legal
roles and to have that encouraged," he said in an interview.
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In the area of civil rights, he
added, practitioners in small
firms are the front-line combatants. "In larger firms, they give
you time to do your 'social consciousness' work, but the
difficulty is, no one approaches
you, nobody comes to you with
real problems-you're
establishment."
In the course of Colom' s practice, he has represented a white
child charging discrimination in a
black-run school system and
aided a Spanish immigrant to
regain custody of the daughter
her husband had given to welfare
officials while his wife was hospitalized. In Professor Donald
Regan's Fourteenth Amendment
class, however, Colom turned his
attention to his best-known
case, Hogan.
In a lively presentation, Colom
outlined Hogan's issues, the strategies that allowed him to
expedite the case's progress
through the courts, and the difficulties he had holding onto it as
its importance and its Supreme
Court destination became
apparent. "There were more people willing to argue this case for
me than [there are] in a hot Mississippi cotton field in the fall,"
he told Regan's students.
Within one year of filing, the
case had made its way from the
local federal court to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which reversed the
federal court's decision. Colom
said h e made haste quickly, but
deliberately, choosing not to file a
class action, for example (he
asked for a declaratory judgment
against MUW's nursing school),
and allowing a summary judgment to go through in
anticipation of an "opinion so
bad" it would n et an expedited
appeal from the Fifth Circuit.
Contained in Colom's account
of the case's progress toward the
Supreme Court, which ruled on
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Yale Kamisar listens as Colom (left) makes an amusing point for students in his criminal
law class.

the case in July, 1982, two years
from its filing, were a number of
personal recommendations.
Colom advised avoidance of timeconsuming class actions and judicious use of pre-trial motions
and memorandums. "Why tell
them what you're up to, as long
as you know what they're up to?"
he asked.
He also counseled sparing use
of expert testimony- "Big law
firms are real high on experts;
also, these experts are real high
on their fees" -and careful reading of relevant cases for useful,
buried facts. In researching the
Hogan case, for example, Colom
found that in every Fifth Circuit
decision in favor of a single-sex
school like MUW, there had been
a "separate-but-equal" facility
for the opposite sex.
Colom likened opening MUW
to men to taking on the U-M
football team in Ann Arbor. The
case, which had important national ramifications for women's
rights, gave him a local reputation as a men's rights champion- and as a troublemaker.

In defending "principle of law
over race" - without considering
"whose ox is being gored," as he
put it in his New York Times Magazine article-Colom has
represented whites against blacks
and Hispanics against whites.
Walking that straight and narrow
road, Colom has encountered
disparaging comments from some
local white attorneys and questions from blacks about his
allegiances.
"You build up black leadership
when you stand for principle,"
Colom has responded to blacks
who forget, or ignore, his track
record battling Jim Crow and his
sixties black power activism.
Because today's civil rights issues
have become "grayer" and the
good guys " less clear," the onus
must be on lawyers, Colom
argued, to elucidate them for the
public.
"The issues are harder to
explain, but no more difficult to
understand," he insisted. "The
side political considerations are
the ones that give you problems,
not considerations of law."
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Securing the blessings of
personal liberty
Cooley lectures offer perspectives from abroad
Although Americans have long
taken it as an article of faith that
constitutional specification of
human rights is the surest route
to their preservation and protection, other free nations have
successfully followed different
courses toward that same goal.
Since World War II, however,
such countries have expressed
increasing interest in the "American way" of fortifying delicate
civil rights terrain against erosion, via constitutional guarantees
and institution of judicial review.
The paths taken in Canada,
Europe, and the United Kingdom
were the focus of this year's
Cooley Lectures, "Constitutional
Protection of Human Rights: Perspectives from Abroad." The talks
were delivered by three distinguished scholars who have also
been active participants in these
national and continental movements, Professors Jochen A.
Frowein, Francis G. Jacobs, and
Paul C. Weiler.
Frowein, a member of the
European Commission of Human
Rights since 1973 and its vice
president since 1980, teaches constitutional and public law at the
University of Heidelberg and is a
director of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law. He
received his M.C.L. from The
University of Michigan and his
doctorate from Bonn University.
Jacobs, who holds an M.A. and
D. Phil. from Oxford, teaches
European law at King's College,
London. Director since 1981 of
the Centre of European Law, he
has served on the Secretariat of
18

the European Commission of
Human Rights and is author of an
important book on the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Weiler, a graduate of the University of Toronto and York
University Law School, is professor of law at Harvard University.
A former chairman of the Labour
Relations Board of British Columbia and a specialist in labor law,
he played an active role in the
formulation of the new Canadian
Charter of Rights, adopted in
1981. He has also written on
Canadian constitutional law.
In a talk entitled "Judges and
Rights in a Democracy: The New
Canadian Version," Weiler offered
a fascinating account of the
Charter's evolution. Interest in
such a charter developed, he said,
as part of broader efforts at constitutional renewal designed to
preserve a united Canada in the
face of French-Canadian nationalism. In its final form, the Charter
is a distinctive Canadian docum~nt that squares the country's
British inheritance of parliamentary sovereignty with the
American practice of judicial
supremacy.
If the American experience with
rights and constitutions has been
dominated, historically, by racial
questions, north of the border the
questions have revolved around
language, Weiler said. Because
the majority of Canada's Frenchspeaking populace has been
located in one province, Quebec,
the country has been tom
between assuring minority rights
through provincial autonomy
and guaranteeing them through

s
constitutionalization. Which
would provide better safeguards?
Which would best facilitate the
drawing of the difficult line
between individual claim and
community need?
With the adoption of the
Charter-much opposed in Quebec in the seventies, Weiler
noted-the question of whether
to constitutionalize was settled, as
was an additional question: the
role the Canadian judiciary would
play in adjudicating rights issues.
Written in broad moral terms,
the Charter makes it clear that the
Canadian judiciary, not Parliament, is responsible for drawing
the lines of "reasonable rights
in a free democracy." Although
there were clear indications that
judges need not be bound by the
current state of Canadian law,
the Charter's framers, Weiler said,
left no hints about how such lines
were to be drawn.
Constitutionalization of rights
was desirable, Weiler said,
because of the more sophisticated
discussion it engenders; but there
were concerns, he recounted,
about the Canadian judiciary's
talent for its new-found adjudicatory role. Solutions to rights
protection should draw on a
country's institutional strengths,
he said, .and that is where the
Charter's non obstante clausewhich gives Parliament the right
to enact statutes superceding the
Charter's authority-comes into
play.
Some have viewed the clause as
mere political expediency. Weiler,
who had a hand in its devising,
justifies it institutionally, as an
"escape valve" from judicial decisions with an awkward real-life
fit. "We must make a practical
judgment about the relative competence of two all-too-human
institutions," he said.
In the second lecture of the
series, "European Integration
through the Protection of Funda-
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mental Rights," Jochen Frowein
focused on the quiet legal revolution effected by the 1950
European Convention on Human
Rights, to which 21 countries
are now signatories.
Until the first quarter of this
century, he noted, judicial protection of human rights against the
legislature was impossible in
most European countries. The
legislature was the last arbiter on
the compatibility of regulations
and bills of rights. The Convention, a quasi-constitutional bill of
rights that established a supranational court and commission,
made available an apparatus for
the judicial protection of fundamental rights.
Effective since 1953, the Convention was something of a
"Sleeping Beauty" for the first
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twenty years of its existence,
Frowein said. He dated its awakening to the early 1970s; today,
few of its signatory states have
not been found in violation of the
Convention at least once-including those with a proud history of
protecting human rights. The
Convention has jarred countries
out of complacency and caused
them to question the adequacy of
existing legal safeguards. It has
also emphasized the notion of
proportionality.
The result has been an impetus
for internal change. Some countries have modified their laws in
response to judgments against
other countries, and the legal
procedures of member states have
become increasingly consonant.
Meanwhile, the supranational
court, located at Strasbourg, has

To conclude the lecture series, faculty and speakers joined forces for a lively panel
discussion. From left: Paul Weiler, Donald Regan, Terrance Sanda/ow, fochen Frowein,
and Francis Jacobs.

s
developed a significant body of
case law to which the countries
look for guidance, Frowein said.
The Convention's major drawback-mentioned by Frowein and
central to Francis Jacobs' talk,
"Towards a United Kingdom Bill
of Rights," is its lack of force as
domestic law in one third of its
signatory states. Britain is one
such state, a fact Frowein and
Jacobs cite as a possible reason
for Britain's record number of
Convention violations.
In his lecture, Jacobs advanced
the case for adopting the Convention as a British bill of rights
enforceable in British courts. Historically, fundamental rights have
been protected by common law
in Britain, subject to statutory acts
of Parliament; but such protection
is no longer sufficient, according
to Jacobs. Noting that Parliament
will legislate on rights issues only
under extreme stress, Jacobs
argued that the Convention offers
an ideal solution to the need for
a United Kingdom bill of rightsa document no nearer to reality
now than it was 10 years ago.
Incorporation would give the
Convention's provisions internal
effect in Britain and eliminate the
"recipe for chaos" that overlapping provisions of a separate,
British-devised bill might create.
It would allow for the required
balance between Parliament and
the courts, which would continue
to be the beneficiaries of Strasbourg case law. The lack of
flexibility and the narrow constructions that might be
engendered by a tightly worded
British bill would be avoided.
Barring a political crisis resulting in a wholly new constitutional settlement, full entrenchment is not a realistic option,
Jacobs said. The interim solution,
he concluded, is for the courts to
"embrace the Convention wholeheartedly," abandoning the
"delicate two-step" of the past.
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